














Do Monetary, Fiscal and Financial Institutions Really 

















 Do Monetary, Fiscal and Financial Institutions Really Matter for
In￿ ation Targeting in Emerging Market Economies?￿
Seedwell Hovey
School of Economics,
University of Cape Town
Albert Touna Mamaz
School of Economics,
University of Cape Town
Fulbert Tchana Tchanax
Department of Research and Modelling,
MinistŁre des Finances du QuØbec
September 29, 2011
Abstract
Most emerging market economies (EMEs) which have implemented in￿ ation
targeting (IT) have continued to experience large, frequent and sometimes per-
sistent in￿ ation target misses. At the same time these countries had reformed
their institutional structures when implementing IT. In this paper we empiri-
cally study the importance of central bank independence, ￿scal discipline and
￿nancial sector development for the achievement of in￿ ation targets in EMEs
using the panel ordered logit model. We ￿nd that when we control for vari-
ables such as output gap, exchange rate gap and openness, the improvement in
central bank independence, ￿scal discipline and ￿nancial systems reduces the
probability of in￿ ation target misses. Importantly, some control variables lead
to the missing of in￿ ation target bands. These are, in order of importance;
exchange rate gap, output gap, in￿ ation target horizon and level of openness.
The combined impact of institutional structures is quite large, indicating their
signi￿cant contribution to the in￿ ation performance and credibility of IT.
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During the 1990s many emerging market economies (EMEs) adopted in￿ ation target-
ing (IT). However, they have continued to miss their targets frequently and sometimes
by wide margins, leading to loss of credibility. This problem persisted despite sig-
ni￿cant institutional reforms. This pattern has therefore raised questions about the
intrinsic role of institutional structures for the achievement of in￿ ation targets in
EMEs.
Two views have emerged in literature about the success of in￿ ation targeting
EMEs in achieving their in￿ ation targets. On one hand, some authors such as Mishkin
(2004) and Fraga et al. (2003) argue that the success of this regime is limited because
of institutional shortfalls and output and in￿ ation volatility trade-o⁄s from external
shocks. On the other hand, Batini and Laxton (2006) reject the view that the fragility
and lack of good initial institutional conditions can impede the successful implemen-
tation of in￿ ation targeting in EMEs. In fact, most EMEs adopted IT in the absence
of most ideal institutional conditions. They stress that the feasibility and success of
IT depends more on the authorities￿commitment to price stability and their ability
to plan and implement institutional changes after adopting in￿ ation targeting.
Despite the intensity of this debate, few papers have analysed the role of monetary,
￿scal and ￿nancial institutional structures for the achievement of in￿ ation targets.1
The paper by Gosselin (2008) however provides some insights. It uses pooled and
￿xed e⁄ects regressions to explain in￿ ation target deviations from the mean on a
sample of developed and developing IT countries. It ￿nds that central bank inde-
pendence and ￿scal balances among other variables seem to explain in￿ ation target
deviations. However, the results are susceptible to heterogeneity bias because the
institutional framework of developed and developing countries di⁄er. In fact, pooling
countries with di⁄erent characteristics together may increase this bias especially if
slope parameters of individual regressions di⁄er across sections. Moreover, the study
uses in￿ ation deviations from the mean as an indicator of IT performance. By this, it
assumes that central banks strictly set point in￿ ation targets. Yet in practice, most
central banks especially in EMEs set target bands (Svensson, 1997).2 This may result
in missing an important dimension in the setting of in￿ ation targets and the role of
1The deviation of in￿ ation from the target bands can be considered an indicator that the central
bank has not been successful especially if it leads to credibility losses. However there are other
indicators which can be considered in determining the overall success of an in￿ ation targeting regime.
2In some cases central banks set in￿ ation target points, but they include tolerance bands.
1institutions for in￿ ation performance of IT in EMEs.
To the best of our knowledge, no work has been done on the role of monetary,
￿scal and ￿nancial institutional factors in explaining in￿ ation target deviations from
the bands in EMEs. This study ￿ll this gap. Speci￿cally, it aims at addressing
the fundamental question of whether the ability to achieve in￿ ation target bands is
a⁄ected by central bank independence (CBI), ￿scal discipline and ￿nancial sector
development in EMEs. This is important because large and frequent in￿ ation target
misses can undermine monetary policy credibility. Within the same framework, the
study also tests if these institutional structures enhance the e⁄ectiveness of monetary
policy.
This study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. Firstly, it charac-
terises and analyses in￿ ation target deviations from the bands as opposed to devia-
tions from the mean, pinning down these institutional di⁄erences. In fact, in￿ ation
target deviations from the bands are intuitively appealing as measures of central bank
performance because most central banks consider in￿ ation to be consistent with their
long term in￿ ation objectives if it is within the target bands (Agenor, 2000). Also,
in￿ ation target bands may act as thresholds for accountability, where some central
banks are required to issue explanatory statements when they miss the target bands
(see e.g. Svensson, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999).3 In addition, Svensson (1997) argues
that, in practice, in￿ ation targeting is ￿ exible as central banks set in￿ ation target
ranges or tolerance intervals rather than target points only.4 Finally, target bands
suggest a nonlinearity in the policy response function, depending on whether in￿ ation
is within the bands or not. This is consistent with an apparent tendency of central
banks to react to in￿ ation when it becomes a problem, but concentrate on other
objectives when in￿ ation is under control (Orphanides and Wieland, 2000).
Secondly, the study isolates and focuses on EMEs. We are not aware of any study
which has analysed this issue for these countries only, yet their characteristics are
di⁄erent from advanced countries. In fact, most EMEs have a long history of insti-
tutional shortfalls, high past in￿ ation records and monetary policy mismanagement
which could account for their current large in￿ ation target deviations and low credi-
3This is the case in Israel, Brazil, Thailand and the Philippines. Other in￿ ation targeting ad-
vanced countries which issue public statements when they miss in￿ ation target bands are the UK,
Canada, Sweden and New Zealand. However some central banks use " escape" clauses in account-
ability arrangements.
4Svensson, 1997 supports his argument by noting that the achievement of speci￿c numerical
in￿ ation targets is impossible due to imperfect control of in￿ ation.
2bility (Mishkin, 2004). Thus in our view, since these countries form a key group in the
world economy, they provide an appropriate sample to test the role of institutional
structures for IT performance.
Thirdly, the study uses a new empirical strategy to estimate the e⁄ects of institu-
tional variables as well as other macroeconomic variables on in￿ ation target outcomes.
Consistent with the nonlinearities in policy responses to di⁄erent in￿ ation target out-
comes, the study models the achievement of in￿ ation target bands or deviations from
the bands by employing the panel ordered logit model. This technique addresses the
nonlinearity issue by carefully identifying and distinguishing between various in￿ ation
target response thresholds; that is, below the target band, within the target band and
above the target band, as they are a⁄ected by institutional factors and other control
variables. It also uses ￿xed e⁄ects to account for unobserved heterogeneity between
countries. More importantly, the paper develops a new computational strategy to
obtain the marginal e⁄ects of di⁄erent in￿ ation target outcomes of an ordered logit
model in a panel data context.
The empirical evidence shows that some institutional variables have signi￿cant
predictive power on the probability of in￿ ation missing the target bands. Precisely,
countries with more independent central banks tend to achieve the target bands fre-
quently. In fact, we use two proxies of CBI; legal CBI indices and turnover rate of
central bank governors. When the legal CBI is the measure of independence of central
banks, we ￿nd that it increases the probability of achieving in￿ ation target bands by
reducing mainly the probability of exceeding the upper target band. A 1% increase in
CBI increases the probability of achieving the target band by 0.16%, while reducing
the probability of being above the band by 0.11%. When we use the turnover rate
of bank governors, we ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ect on the probability of achieving or not
achieving the target band. This result suggests instead that in EMEs, lower turnover
of central bank governors is not necessarily a sign of more independent central banks.
Also using two proxies of ￿scal discipline; budget de￿cit to GDP and the ratio
of debt to GDP, we ￿nd that countries with weak ￿scal institutions have a higher
probability of having in￿ ation higher than the upper target band. An increase in
the budget de￿cits to GDP ratio increases the probability of being above the upper
target bound while it reduces the probability of being under the lower target bound.
When we replace budget de￿cits to GDP with the domestic debt to GDP ratio,
similar e⁄ects are observed.
We also investigate the importance of ￿nancial sector development in IT using
3two indicators; private credit to GDP ratio and liquid liabilities to GDP. The evi-
dence shows that an increase in private credit to GDP ratio increases signi￿cantly the
probability of in￿ ation staying in the target band. But when we use liquid liabilities
to GDP ratio, we ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ect.
Although our ￿ndings reveal that strong and well-managed ￿scal, monetary and
￿nancial institutions improve the performance of in￿ ation targeting in EMEs, it ap-
pears that some external and domestic factors also matter. These variables are in
order of importance: exchange rate gap, output gap, in￿ ation target horizon and de-
gree of openness. However, some institutional variables are more robust to sensitivity
tests than others.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines existing literature on
institutional patterns and in￿ ation performance. Section 3 presents the methodology,
while section 4 presents the data and stylised facts. Section 5 reports the estimation
results. Section 6 provides robustness and sensitivity analysis. Finally, section 7
presents the conclusion and policy recommendations.
2 Review of Literature
2.1 Central Bank Independence
There are at least two de￿nitions of CBI in literature: (i) according to Walsh (2003),
CBI relates to the freedom of monetary policymakers from direct political or gov-
ernmental in￿ uence in the conduct of monetary policy; (ii) Cukierman et al. (1992)
de￿ned it as the ability of the central bank to stick to the goal of price stability even
at the cost of short term objectives.5
Two in￿ uential theories plausibly explain how CBI can contribute to the achieve-
ment of in￿ ation targets. Firstly, the public choice theory proposed by Buchanan
and Wagner (1977) argues that central banks are exposed to strong political pressure
to behave in accordance with government￿ s preferences to expand the economy by
loosening monetary policy at particular times, especially election periods. This may
create a political monetary cycle. This theory suggests that CBI can reduce the pre-
election manipulation of monetary policy and increase credibility of commitments to
price stability by constraining the government￿ s ability to in￿ ate.
5The CBI which gives freedom to choose the policy tool by which to achieve its goals with-
out interference from the government is more relevant for IT because the central bank should be
accountable, based on the achievement of in￿ ation targets.
4Secondly, the dynamic inconsistency theory by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
Barro and Gordon (1983) acknowledges the absence of precommitment in monetary
policy as a source of in￿ ationary bias. It argues that the best plan made in the
present for some future period may no longer be optimal when that period actually
arrives. This makes in￿ ation to be sub-optimal because private sector wages and
prices are formed before observing aggregate demand. This gives central banks an
ex-post opportunism to temporarily boost output by allowing in unanticipated higher
in￿ ation which reduces the real wage of workers. Due to private expectations that
in￿ ation will be high, the policy maker￿ s ability to pursue discretionary policy results
in in￿ ation without increase in output. This theory predicts that an independent
central bank may be necessary to control money creation capacities, both directly by
shaping central bank incentives and indirectly, through their credibility e⁄ects. Based
on these theoretical foundations, the following testable hypothesis can be derived:
Hypothesis 1. Countries with more independent central banks are likely to achieve
their in￿ation targets most of the time.
So far some empirical work has been done to test the role of central bank inde-
pendence on in￿ ation outcomes. However, there are di⁄erent results on its e⁄ects.
Cukierman et al. (1992) used both de jure and de facto measures of CBI for 72 coun-
tries for the period 1950-1989 and found that legal CBI negatively a⁄ects in￿ ation
and its variability in developed countries.6 They also observed that the turnover
rate of central bank governors (a de facto measure of CBI) had no correlation with
in￿ ation in developed countries but had signi￿cant e⁄ects on in￿ ation in developing
countries.7 Nevertheless, their study explained the role of CBI on in￿ ation in general
and not on achieving in￿ ation targets, which is the focus of our paper. Further, the
study focuses on a small set of control variables and leaves some important variables
for developing countries.8
Using data from 1985-1988 for 16 developed countries, Alesina and Summers
(1993) also presented evidence of a strong negative relationship between in￿ ation
6They noted that the key channel through which low CBI leads to in￿ ation is through the
provision of credit to government. See also Grilli et al, 1991, for further evidence of the e⁄ects of
CBI on economic outcomes.
7Frequent changes of the central bank governor is a strong indication of low level of CBI, because
it shows that the political authorities have more opportunity to have central bank governors that
will follow their policies than governors that will challenge them.
8For example, they did not consider variables which account for exchange rates, in￿ ation inertia
and trade openness.
5variability and CBI9. However, the analytical framework in their study is not rigor-
ous as it only used simple correlations based on cross sectional data which does not
provide much information on the long run relationships.
Posen (1998) argued that any conclusion based on the negative correlation of CBI
and in￿ ation is not robust enough because correlation does not necessarily imply
causation. He proceeded to study 17 OECD countries for the period 1950-1989 and
found that CBI does not necessarily reduce the political manipulation of monetary
policy or reduce the monetization of budget de￿cits. Hence it does not lead to low
in￿ ation through the enhancement of commitments to price stability. The study
focused on developed countries, with di⁄erent institutional dynamics from developing
countries hence its ￿ndings maybe quite unconvincing to be generalised for EMEs.
Most related to our study is the paper by Gosselin (2008) who studied 21 IT
countries from 1990-200510. He found that CBI was negatively correlated with in-
￿ ation deviations from the mean among other variables. However, he did not use
alternative measures of central bank independence, for example the de facto CBI to
test for robustness of the de jure measure. Moreover the consideration of in￿ ation
target deviations from the target mean does not re￿ ect uncertainity in the in￿ ation
process and obscures the clear analysis of central bank performance with regard to
in￿ ation targets. Our study uses both de jure and de facto measures of CBI in a
uni￿ed framework to explain in￿ ation deviations from the target bands.
2.2 Fiscal Discipline
Fiscal discipline entails managing competing and often excessive claims on limited
public resources for macroeconomic stability, without running large and unsustain-
able budget de￿cits (Younger et al., 1998). There is a general consensus that ￿scal
discipline is important for the credibility and viability of price stability.11
Theoretical foundations of the relationship between ￿scal discipline and in￿ ation
outcomes relate to many hypothesis. The ￿scal dominance hypotheses proposed by
Sargent and Wallace (1981) postulates that ￿scally dominant governments running
persistent budget de￿cits may need to ￿nance them with money printing. When
a binding ￿nancing constraint forces the government to ￿nance its budget de￿cits
9Other recent studies e.g. Crowe and Meade (2008) found similar results.
10The sample was composed of 8 industrial countries and 13 emerging market economies.
11This is the case especially in EMEs with low tax bases, ine¢ cient tax collection systems and
limited access to external borrowing which tend to increase dependence on seigniorage (see e.g.
Catao and Terrones, 2005)
6through the in￿ ation tax, any attempt to lower in￿ ation today will require higher
in￿ ation tomorrow. This may occur because the central bank cannot in￿ uence the
size of the government￿ s budget de￿cit, but may be forced to ￿nance the de￿cit by
seigniorage revenue. This theory predicts that consistently high budget de￿cits are
likely to result in persistent in￿ ation target deviations through monetization of public
de￿cits.
The debt dynamics hypothesis by Blanchard (2004) posits that in cases where
interest payments on government￿ s domestic debt or expectations of future money
growth are high, in￿ ation can rise persistently. Current debt levels may not lead to
higher in￿ ation now, but to higher in￿ ation in the future because of high interest
payments and expectations. From these reviews we can derive a testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Fiscal discipline and sustainable public debt reduces in￿ation devia-
tions from the target bands.
Although theory provides coherent and similar predictions about the e⁄ects of
￿scal balances on in￿ ation, the empirical evidence so far is rather elusive. For example,
De Haan and Zelhorst (1990) found a positive long-run relationship between in￿ ation
and budget de￿cits in high in￿ ation countries on a panel of 7 developing countries
from 1961-1985. Catao and Terrones (2005) made similar conclusions using a dynamic
panel of 103 developing and developed countries from 1960-2001. While these papers
give one dimension of the in￿ ationary e⁄ects of budget de￿cits, they do not assess
their implications for the success of IT in EMEs.
On the other hand, Fischer et al. (2002) explored the question using a panel of
133 countries for the period 1960-1995. They found a negative relationship between
￿scal de￿cits and in￿ ation which was only strong in high in￿ ation countries and for
high in￿ ation episodes but no obvious relationship in low in￿ ation episodes. How-
ever, the focus on both developed and developing countries together could introduce
heterogeneity bias because of di⁄erences in their ￿scal institutions.
More recently, Gosselin (2008) found that ￿scal de￿cits account for in￿ ation devia-
tions from the target mean for the sample of both developed and developing countries.
The question which remains is whether this applies to EMEs, when in￿ ation devia-
tions from the bands are considered. This has not been explored before.
72.3 Financial Sector Development
Two channels through which ￿nancial sector development a⁄ect the achievement of
in￿ ation targets can be considered; (i) the role of the ￿nancial sector in reducing
government reliance on seigniorage revenue (see e.g. Neyapti, 2003) and (ii) the credit
channel transmission mechanism (see e.g. Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Bernanke and
Gertler, 1995). Neyapti (2003)￿ s framework postulates that when the ￿nancial sector
is not developed, ￿scal dominance is rife because the government relies on central
bank funding for its budget de￿cits. The model predicts that the degree to which
budget de￿cits are in￿ ationary depends to a greater extent on the level of development
of the ￿nancial sector. If the ￿nancial sector is small relative to the budget de￿cit,
it may fail to absorb newly issued debt, forcing the central bank to monetise the
de￿cits. According to this view, when ￿nancial markets are developed, it is easier for
the government to ￿nance its budget de￿cits from the capital markets without relying
on seigniorage.
The credit channel monetary transmission mechanism proposed by Bernanke and
Blinder (1988) and Bernanke and Gertler (1995) argue that the direct e⁄ects of mone-
tary policy on interest rates are ampli￿ed by the size of the external ￿nance premium.
Since the external ￿nance premium a⁄ects the overall price of funds, credit market
imperfections a⁄ect the consumption and investment decisions, and ultimately prices
and output, through economic agent￿ s net worth (balance sheet) and bank lending
channels.12 This model suggests that the transmission of interest rate movements
to a⁄ect output and price depends on the structure of the ￿nancial system. In this
case, deep ￿nancial systems transmit monetary impulses faster than shallow ￿nancial
systems. These theoretical rationale lead to the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Countries with more developed ￿nancial systems are likely to keep
in￿ation within the target bands most of the times.
There are few empirical studies which investigated the role of ￿nancial sector
development on monetary policy. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) tested the e⁄ects
of ￿nancial sector development on the speed of the monetary transmission process
using a two step procedure on a panel of 31 developed and developing countries.
12The balance sheet channel asserts that the borrower￿ s net worth negatively a⁄ects the external
￿nance premium, hence a⁄ects economic variables. Bank lending channel relates to the e⁄ects of
monetary policy on the external ￿nance premium by shifting the cost and supply of intermediated
credit.
8They concluded that higher ￿nancial sector development improves the speed of the
transmission process. However, this result could be highly sensitive to in￿ uential
observations particularly in developed countries which have arguably higher levels of
￿nancial sector development than developing countries.
Posen (1995) used the ￿nancial opposition to in￿ ation (FOI) on a sample of 32 de-
veloped and developing countries from 1960-1989. He found that FOI has a predictive
negative e⁄ect on in￿ ation outcomes. He argued that the ￿nancial sector can sup-
port short-run stabilisation policies of the central bank by lobbying for anti-in￿ ation
practices.13 Thus the bigger the ￿nancial sector, the more the ￿nancial opposition to
in￿ ation the economy has. Nevertheless, this study did not account separately, for
the e⁄ects of FOI between di⁄erent groups of countries.
Neyapti (2003) used GMM to test the e⁄ects of ￿nancial sector development and
CBI on budget de￿cits and in￿ ation on 54 developed and developing countries from
1970-1989. She found that when the ￿nancial sector is not developed, the positive
e⁄ect of budget de￿cits on in￿ ation is strong and CBI a⁄ects both the degree of cur-
rent and future monetary accommodation of budget de￿cits. Although this analysis
provides a framework of understanding the role of ￿nancial markets in price stability,
it does not analyse its e⁄ects on in￿ ation target deviations.
On the other hand, Gosselin (2008) found no signi￿cant role of ￿nancial sector
development in explaining in￿ ation target deviations from the mean. However, his
work does not test explicitly the interactions of ￿nancial variables and the interest
rates to determine if monetary policy e⁄ectiveness is enhanced by higher ￿nancial
sector development.
3 Methodology
This section presents the empirical strategy used in the estimation.
To test the hypotheses highlighted, we specify our empirical model for the likeli-
hood of in￿ ation target deviations from the target bands conditional on institutional
factors and other control variables as follows;
Infldevit = ￿i + ￿Instit + ￿Xit + "it (1)
Where Infldevit is the in￿ ation deviation from the band, Instit is the vector of
13Thus, the central bank can only guarantee price stability as long as the ￿nancial sector supports
such a policy.
9institutional variables, Xit is a vector of control variables, ￿i is a vector of country
speci￿c unobserved e⁄ects that are assumed to be constant over time, ￿ and ￿ are
vectors of slope coe¢ cients that are common to all countries, "it is a vector of error
terms and i and t are country and time indices respectively.
Given the discontinuous and ordinal nature of the dependent variable, it is more
appropriate to estimate (1) with a panel ordered logit model.14 The panel ordered
logit model is theoretically appealing because it can account for di⁄erent in￿ ation
target response outcomes and model the nonlinearities in the policy responses to
in￿ ation target deviations. In addition, it converges quickly while providing a more
￿ exible analytical framework. In this case, in￿ ation or (in￿ation deviation) can be
in three possible states, that is below the target band (negative deviation), within
the target band (no deviation) and above the target band (positive deviation). The
response mechanism is that in￿ ation takes a value of 0 if it is below the target band
(negative deviation), 1 if it is within the target band (no deviation) and 2 if it is
above the target band (positive deviation).
We estimate the panel ordered logit model with ￿xed e⁄ects to accommodate
country-speci￿c unobserved e⁄ects. Indeed as argued by Maddala (1987), ￿xed ef-
fects logit models give consistent estimates using the conditional maximum likelihood
method, where we condition on the ￿xed e⁄ects. The panel ordered logit econometric
procedure is explained in detail in Appendix A.
In discrete choice models, the parameters that are normally provided are the
marginal e⁄ects because they have reasonable asymptotic properties and can be in-
terpreted easily (Wooldridge, 2002). However, in the case of the panel data, no
programme is available in the Stata package which can help us to do this directly.
We use the GLLAMM module by Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2004) to estimate the ￿xed
e⁄ects ordered logit model. This programme allows the speci￿cations of nonlinear
models that can accommodate many response categories. Moreover, it can handle
unobserved heterogeneity due to individual country features for ordinal endogenous
variables in its computational framework. We develop a three-step procedure of esti-
mating marginal e⁄ects using GLLAMM. This is explained in Appendix B.
14We consider that when in￿ ation is within the in￿ ation band, that provides some discontinuity on
the target deviation which records zero (no deviation) even if there are di⁄erent in￿ ation outcomes
in that range.
104 Data and stylised facts
The paper uses quarterly panel data of 15 in￿ ation targeting EMEs from 1991-2008.
The panel is unbalanced because of di⁄erent adoption dates for in￿ ation targeting.
Table 4 shows the sample of IT emerging market economies and their structural char-
acteristics. The dependent variable is in￿ ation target deviation, an ordinal discrete
variable measured as the absolute deviation of in￿ ation from target bands. We con-
sider explicit in￿ ation targets for each country. For many countries, in￿ ation targets
are based on the headline consumer price index.15 We focus speci￿cally on three insti-
tutional categories; monetary institutions, ￿scal institutions and ￿nancial institutions
which are captured by CBI indicators, ￿scal discipline indicators and ￿nancial sector
development indicators.
CBI indicators used are legal CBI index (logcbi1), which is a de jure measure
of CBI and the turnover rate of central bank governors (logtor), which is a de facto
measure of CBI. For legal CBI we use the index which was developed by Cukierman
et al. (1992) and updated by Polillo and Guillen (2005), Crowe and Meade (2008) and
ourselves for more recent years. This measure is an aggregate index computed from
sixteen di⁄erent legal characteristics found in central bank laws.16 It is conceptually
attractive because it is a comprehensive measure which captures the operating insti-
tutional framework and various structural aspects of central banks in each country.
It has also been widely used in literature.17 Higher index values indicate higher cen-
tral bank independence. It is expected to be negatively related to positive in￿ ation
target deviations. The turnover rate of central bank governors is alternatively used
because central banks may be more independent in practice than what is stated in
their legislations (Cukierman et al., 1992)18. It is expected to be positively related to
positive in￿ ation deviations.
15However, some countries e.g. Thailand set in￿ ation targets in terms of core in￿ ation. South
Korea and the Czech Republic used to de￿ne their targets in terms of core in￿ ation but have now
moved to headline in￿ ation.
16The legal characteristics: term of o¢ ce, appointment, dismisal, other government responsibilities
of the governor, price stability objective, monetary policy formulation, con￿ ict resolution, role of
central bank in government, advance and limits of loans to government, decisions on terms of lending,
bene￿ciaries, types of limits, loan maturity, restrictions on interest and ban on buying or selling
government bonds in the market.
17(See e.g Campillo and Miron, 1996; Crowe and Meade, 2008; Jacome and Vazquez, 2008)
18Turnover rate of central bank governors is calculated as the number of governors in a certain
period divided by the reference term of o¢ ce. The higher the turnover, the higher the risk of
in￿ uencing the executive branch, hence the lower the independence. Long tenure gives the governor
the independent reputation that may solidify his resistance to political pressure.
11Fiscal discipline is proxied by budget de￿cits as a percentage of GDP (bd) and
domestic debt as a percentage of GDP (debt). The primary ￿scal balance to GDP is
used because it is a relatively good principal component indicator of the level of ￿scal
discipline which assesses the orientation of ￿scal policy over the ￿scal year (Fischer
et al., 2002). It accounts for the fact that the achievement of in￿ ation targets may
depend on the reform of ￿scal institutions. Domestic debt to GDP is alternatively
used because countries with high debt to GDP ratios are likely to use seigniorage or
in￿ ate the debt in future (Reinhart and Rogo⁄, 2008). We expect ￿scal balance or
debt to raise the likelihood of in￿ ation deviation from the upper band.
Financial sector development is measured by private credit to GDP ratio (logpcrdt)
and alternatively by liquid liabilities to GDP ratio (logll_gdp). Private credit to GDP
is the value of all credit that ￿nancial intermediaries issue to the private sector as a
share of GDP. It is the preferred measure of ￿nancial sector development in literature
because higher levels of private credit indicate larger involvement of the private sector
in the economy. Liquid liabilities to GDP ratio is composed of currency plus demand
and interest bearing liabilities of banks and non banks. It re￿ ects the size of the
￿nancial sector relative to the economy (see e.g Levine et al., 2000; Boyd et al., 2001).
Based on the standard literature on in￿ ation dynamics, we choose the following
control variables in our regressions: output gap (lygp) to account for business cycle
growth, exchange rate gap (lexrg) to account for the e⁄ects of exchange rates on
in￿ ation, terms of trade (logtot) to account for external shocks, openness (logopen) to
control for exposure to external shocks, while lagged in￿ ation(in￿g) account for the
persistence e⁄ects of in￿ ation. Policy rates (rts) are there to capture central bank
policy instruments which re￿ ect monetary policy decisions. This follows from the
understanding that in an in￿ ation targeting framework, whenever in￿ ation deviates
from the target, central banks use interest rates to bring in￿ ation within the target
bands (Svensson, 1997). We also control for the in￿ ation targeting horizon (loghorzn).
This is the period over which in￿ ation is required to return to the target band following
a shock (Roger and Stone, 2005). It is an important variable to consider since it
relates to the design of IT with respect to its response to shocks.19 Since these
control variables cover a wide range of characteristics of EMEs, they also help to
reduce omitted variable bias, which has plagued most previous studies.
19Since in￿ ation target horizon is related to the design of IT, it can be considered as an institutional
variable. However, we have controlled for this variable in order to evaluate the explicit role played by
central bank independence, ￿scal discipline and ￿nancial sector development in in￿ ation targeting.
12The main sources of data are IMF￿ s International Financial Statistics, World De-
velopment Indicators, Datastream, Global Insight and various Central Bank websites.
Table 5 in the appendix provides variable descriptions and their sources in detail.
We also present some stylised facts on institutional patterns and in￿ ation target
outcomes. According to Roger and Stone (2005), in￿ ation targeting countries have
missed their target ranges by about 40% of the time and that EMEs have experienced
more target misses of about 52.2% of the time compared with developed countries
with 34.8%. In Table 6 we show several stylized facts about the experience of EMEs
in the achievement of in￿ ation targets. The average frequencies of target misses are
about 15% and 43% below and above the targets respectively. The Philippines, Poland
and Peru experienced most frequent target misses below the target band while Israel,
the Philippines, South Africa and Turkey experienced more target deviations above
the bands. Colombia, Chile, and the Czech Republic achieved their in￿ ation targets
most of the times. In terms of magnitudes, deviations above the target are more
common, averaging 3.43% compared with deviations below the band which average
-1%. Indeed, large deviations above the upper target bands are generally considered
to be more harmful than deviations below the target bands in EMEs.20
In terms of persistence, Table 6 shows that in￿ ation target deviations above the
bands averages 4.9 quarters, which may re￿ ect the average in￿ ation target horizon. A
common trend is that countries tend to overshoot than undershoot their target bands
in their disin￿ ation stages. Generally, large, more frequent and persistent in￿ ation
target deviations were common in Brazil, Israel, South Africa and Thailand.
In Figure 1, we bring institutional dynamics in the picture by presenting their
relationship with in￿ ation target outcomes at an aggregate level in EMEs. We observe
that on average there has been progressive improvement in monetary and ￿nancial
institutional structures in emerging countries since the 1990s. This corresponds to
a noticeable decrease in the magnitude of in￿ ation target deviations. This pattern
suggests that there could be a link between institutional structures and in￿ ation
target deviations. Two horizons can be noticed in Figure 1. First, is a disin￿ ationary
trend in the 1990s which was associated with large and frequent in￿ ation target
deviations. For many countries, higher in￿ ation deviations during the disin￿ ationary
periods were attributed to previous hyperin￿ ations, weak institutions and imbalances
20Naturally economic agents prefer lower in￿ ation to higher in￿ ation, hence upper target misses
may have more costs and lead to credibility loss. Also most central banks associate larger welfare
losses to positive than negative in￿ ation deviations. However, there is a threat of a zero lower bound
if deviations below the band persist, but the risk has been considered to be minimal for most EMEs.
13of previous monetary anchors which had not subsided (Petursson, 2004). Second,
is a more stable in￿ ation horizon associated with relatively low in￿ ation and small
in￿ ation target deviations in the 2000s. This pattern may re￿ ect the improvement in
institutional structures and monetary policy management.21

























Figure 2 in the Appendix shows institutional patterns and in￿ ation target per-
formance of individual EMEs. The ￿gure shows that Chile and South Africa have
strong monetary, ￿scal and ￿nancial institutions as measured by central bank inde-
pendence, budget de￿cit to GDP ratio and private credit to GDP ratio. On the other
hand, Brazil, Thailand and South Korea have poor institutional frameworks. But in
terms of in￿ ation targeting performance, in￿ ation has stayed within the range most
of the times in Chile, Thailand and South Korea, while in South Africa, Brazil, Is-
rael and Poland it has often been outside the range. In some countries, for example
Brazil, the government has been considered to have a history of poor support for
price stability, where laws supporting CBI have been easily overturned (Albagli and
21The Great Moderation could also have contributed to general stability of in￿ ation and low
in￿ ation target deviations in the 2000s.
14Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003). It is therefore important to analyse the role of institutional
patterns for in￿ ation targeting performance in EMEs.
4.1 Panel data estimation issues
Estimation of the panel ordered logit model raises several methodological issues. First,
there is the possibility of endogeneity in our institutional variables. For example
legal reform of central banks may be a response to high in￿ ation rates. Neyapti
(2003) also noted that high budget de￿cits may force monetary authorities to tighten
monetary policy inorder to reduce in￿ ation. In addition, price stabilisation due to
in￿ ation targeting may improve ￿nancial development (Boyd et al., 2001). Secondly,
non-stationarity of variables is an issue since we are dealing with macroeconomic
data. Thirdly, we need to check for the presence of multicollinearity of variables and
heteroskedasticity of the residuals.
We use the Hausman technique to test for potential endogeneity of our key institu-
tional variables; legal CBI, private credit to GDP and budget de￿cits to GDP. We use
￿rst lags of these variables as instruments in the test for endogeneity. The Hausman
test statistic is 1.81 with a p-value of 0.97, hence we accept the null hypothesis of
no endogeneity. Therefore the analysis is based on the standard panel ordered logit
model.
We also test for stationarity in all the variables using the Fisher-type test as
suggested by Maddala and Wu (1999). This test involves combining the p-values of
the test statistics for unit root in each cross-sectional unit to generate a test statistic.
The null hypothesis is that there are unit roots (not stationary) against the alternative
that at least one is stationary. This test is more appropriate because it can be applied
in unbalanced panels. Table 8 shows the results. Legal CBI was not stationary in
levels and became stationary after ￿rst di⁄erencing, but the rest of the variables were
stationary in levels. We also test for possible cointegration in the non-stationary
variable using the Persyn and Westerlund (2008) technique.22 Using robust p-values,
we found no cointegration.
The possibility of multicollinearity on the variables is inferred using correlation
coe¢ cients. Table 7 shows the pairwise correlation matrix for all the variables. We
do not suspect the presence of serious multicollinearity in our explanatory variables
22This technique is composed of four tests which do not impose common factor restrictions on the
data.
15because of low correlations. This is also the case with our institutional variables.23
Some variables were transformed into logs in order to stabilise the variances. We also
use robust standard errors in our estimations to deal with possible heteroskedasticity.
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we present and discuss the results from the estimations. The discussion
of results is based on marginal e⁄ects. These tell us the probability of having in￿ ation
falling in each in￿ ation target category following a unit change in a particular variable.
5.1 Central Bank Independence
The institutional variables were added to the ordered logit regression one at a time.
The results for two CBI measures; legal CBI (logcbi1) and turnover rate of central
bank governors (logtor) are shown in Table 1.
Model 1 shows regression which includes CBI and all control variables. The re-
sults in Model 1 show that higher legal CBI reduces the probability of having in￿ ation
above the target band. At the same time an increase in the legal CBI increases the
probability of having in￿ ation within the target band as well as below the target band.
Quantitatively, a 1% increase in legal CBI index results in a decrease in the proba-
bility of having in￿ ation above the target by 0.11%, while increasing the probability
of achieving the target band by 0.16%. The probability of having in￿ ation below the
target also increases by 0.05% as CBI increases. The results suggest that countries
with more aggressive central bank reforms have better chances of achieving in￿ ation
targets, which may re￿ ect a stronger ability to commit to price stability (Cukierman
et al., 1992). This is consistent with the dynamic inconsistency hypothesis which in-
dicates that higher CBI may eliminate policy makers￿appetite for surprise in￿ ation.
These results are in line with other studies, for example Gosselin (2008), who made
similar conclusions on in￿ ation deviations from the mean.
When the turnover rate of central bank governors is used as a measure of CBI, we
￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ect on the probability of achieving the target band or missing
the target bands. The signs of marginal e⁄ects are contrary to expectations. This
result suggests instead that in EMEs, lower turnover of the central bank governors is
not necessarily a sign of a high central bank independence. This may be due to the
fact that it is not a very comprehensive measure as it focuses on one central bank
23However private credit to GDP is highly correlated to domestic debt to GDP ratio
16Table 1: Ordered logit results: the e⁄ects of central bank indepedence
Model 1 Model 1￿
Variables mfx0 mfx1 mfx2 mfx0 mfx1 mfx2
lygp -0.181*** -0.0681** 0.249*** -0.181*** -0.0779** 0.259***
(0.0572) (0.0478) (0.0476) (0.0604) (0.0537) (0.0480)
lexrg -0.419*** -0.223*** 0.642*** -0.419*** -0.225*** 0.644***
(0.0727) (0.0698) (0.0800) (0.0756) (0.0716) (0.0821)
logtot -0.0280 -0.0842* 0.112** -0.0278 -0.0853* 0.113**
(0.0285) (0.0423) (0.0482) (0.0281) (0.0427) (0.0494)
logopen -0.163*** -0.0320 0.195*** -0.154*** -0.0378 0.192***
(0.0479) (0.0437) (0.0278) (0.0504) (0.0509) (0.0300)
loghorzn -0.182*** 0.0553 0.126** -0.183*** 0.0541 0.129**
(0.0418) (0.0484) (0.0576) (0.0405) (0.0446) (0.0586)
rts -0.00999** 0.000134 0.00985 -0.00965** -1.47e-05 0.00966
(0.00414) (0.00371) (0.00584) (0.00411) (0.00382) (0.00583)
in￿ g -0.0127*** -0.0141*** 0.0268*** -0.0128*** -0.0142** 0.0270***
(0.00348) (0.00468) (0.00785) (0.00352) (0.00479) (0.00801)
logcbi1 0.0502** 0.159** -0.109**
(0.0637) (0.0681) (0.0567)
logtor 0.00848 0.0154 -0.0239*
(0.0118) (0.0172) (0.0153)
Constant -0.00169** -0.00235** 0.00404** -0.00143* -0.00291** 0.00434**
(0.000761) (0.00107) (0.00168) (0.000711) (0.00108) (0.00168)
Observations 586 586 586 586 586 586
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15 15
R2 0.339 0.289 0.527 0.334 0.277 0.525
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Model 1 is the ordered logit model including logcbi1
Model 1￿is the ordered logit model including logtor
mfx0, mfx1 and mfx2 are marginal e⁄ects of having in￿ ation below the band, within the band and
above the band respectively.
17feature. Mas (1995) argued that low turnover rate of central bank governors may
rather indicate a low CBI instead of higher CBI because the subservient governor
can stay in o¢ ce longer than a governor who tries to resist political pressure.24 How-
ever the results contradicts the conclusions by Cukierman et al. (1992) and Jacome
and Vazquez (2008) who found its signi￿cance in explaining in￿ ation outcomes in
developing countries.25
Table 9 shows results when all institutional variables are included in the regres-
sion together. We observe that the marginal e⁄ects for legal CBI increases and are
signi￿cant. This improvement in the results may suggest that these institutional vari-
ables are complementary. For example a credible central bank may commit not to
￿nance the ￿scal de￿cit, which may strengthen ￿scal authorities￿incentive to balance
the budget (Grilli et al., 1991). However, the turnover rate of central bank governors
remain insigni￿cant.
5.2 Fiscal Discipline
Table 2 presents the results when ￿scal institutional variables are used. Model 2 shows
regressions with budget de￿cits to GDP ratio while model 2￿shows results when we
use domestic debt to GDP ratio instead.
The results show that an increase in budget de￿cits increases the likelihood of
missing the upper in￿ ation target band while reducing the likelihood of missing the
lower in￿ ation target band and achieving the in￿ ation target band. In fact, a 1%
increase in budget de￿cit increases the likelihood of in￿ ation being above the target
band by about 0.007%, while it reduces the likelihood of being below the target band
and of being within the band by 0.005% and 0.001% respectively. The e⁄ects are
signi￿cant at the 1% level. This is intuitive for EMEs considering their poor ￿scal
institutions (Catao and Terrones, 2005). The results are consistent with Sargent and
Wallace (1981)￿ s ￿scal dominance hypothesis and the empirical ￿ndings of De Haan
and Zelhorst (1990) and Catao and Terrones (2005) which show that high budget
de￿cits may lead to high in￿ ation while ￿scal consolidation enhances the achievement
of in￿ ation targets. The evidence suggests that countries that seek a low in￿ ation
path should ensure that their ￿scal positions do not lead to ￿scal dominance.
24Walsh (2003) argued that in countries where the rule of law is embedded in political culture,
there can be a wide gap between legal CBI and actual CBI.
25As Cukierman et al. (1992) note, possibly this could be explained by the fact that legal CBI
and the turnover rate of central bank governors are measuring orthogonal aspects of CBI.
18Table 2: Ordered logit results: The e⁄ects of ￿scal discipline
Model 2 Model 2￿
Variables mfx0 mfx1 mfx2 mfx0 mfx1 mfx2
lygp -0.131* -0.164* 0.295*** -0.155** -0.0633* 0.218***
(0.0700) (0.0992) (0.0568) (0.0659) (0.0527) (0.0473)
lexrg -0.411*** -0.287*** 0.698*** -0.407*** -0.268*** 0.675***
(0.0719) (0.0675) (0.0866) (0.0759) (0.0869) (0.0847)
logtot 0.00666 -0.0959* 0.0892 -0.0465 -0.0203 0.0668*
(0.0243) (0.0536) (0.0524) (0.0416) (0.0394) (0.0367)
logopen -0.136** -0.0647** 0.200** -0.158** -0.0492** 0.207**
(0.0503) (0.0513) (0.0310) (0.0559) (0.0551) (0.0280)
loghorzn -0.194*** 0.119 0.0750* -0.169*** 0.0472 0.122**
(0.0445) (0.0780) (0.0533) (0.0410) (0.0599) (0.0542)
rts -0.0101** 0.000366 0.00969* -0.00948* 0.000131 0.00934
(0.00409) (0.00446) (0.00547) (0.00455) (0.00413) (0.00555)
in￿ g -0.0126*** -0.0133** 0.0259*** -0.0134*** -0.0139** 0.0273***
(0.00329) (0.00458) (0.00746) (0.00406) (0.00471) (0.00844)
bd -0.00524*** -0.00136*** 0.0066***
(0.000600) (0.00118) (0.000599)
debt -0.00210*** -0.00358*** 0.00568***
(0.000263) (0.000273) (0.000419)
Constant -0.00137** -0.00308** 0.00445** -0.00166** -0.00226* 0.00392**
(0.000619) (0.00123) (0.00156) (0.000671) (0.00118) (0.00166)
Observations 586 586 586 586 586 586
R2 0.422 0.264 0.578 0.340 0.271 0.540
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15 15
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Model 2 is the ordered logit model including budget de￿cit to GDP ratio
Model 2￿is the ordered logit model including domestic debt to GDP ratio.
mfx0, mfx1 and mfx2 are marginal e⁄ects of having in￿ ation below the band, within the band and
above the band respectively.
19When the ratio of debt to GDP is the variable which captures ￿scal discipline, we
observe that its increase reduces the probability of being in the target band mainly
by increasing signi￿cantly the probability of being above the upper bound. A 1%
increase in debt to GDP ratio signi￿cantly increases the probability of exceeding the
upper bound by 0.006%. At the same time, an increase in debt signi￿cantly decrease
the probability of undershooting the lower bound by 0.002% while the probability of
in￿ ation staying within the target bound also decreases by about 0.0036%. Consistent
with earlier work (see e.g. Campillo and Miron, 1996), our results support the view
that unsustainable public debts makes monetary authorities reluctant to raise interest
rates to ￿ght in￿ ation because such increases would raise the cost of debt service.
When institutional variables are included together in the regression (as shown in
Table 9), the marginal e⁄ects are magni￿ed for both budget de￿cits to GDP and
domestic debt to GDP. For example the likelihood of overshooting the target band
signi￿cantly increases by 0.0068% and 0.0057% following a 1% increase in budget
de￿cits and debt respectively. This lends further support for ￿scal consolidation as a
condition of sustained price stability.
5.3 Financial Sector Development
The e⁄ects of ￿nancial sector development are indicated by the private credit to GDP
ratio (logpcrdt) and liquid liability to GDP (logll_gdp). The results are presented in
Table 3. Model 3 reports the results for private credit to GDP ratio while model 3￿
replaces the private credit to GDP by liquid liabilities to GDP.
The results show that an increase in the private credit to GDP ratio increases
signi￿cantly the probability of staying in the target band and of having in￿ ation
below the target. On the other hand an increase in private credit to GDP reduces
the probability of having in￿ ation above the target band. In fact, a 1% increase
in private credit to GDP translates into an increase of 0.12% in the probability of
staying in the target band as well as 0.06% of having in￿ ation in the lower band.
At the same time, an increase in private credit to GDP reduces the probability of
in￿ ation overshooting the upper band by 0.055%. The marginal e⁄ects are signi￿cant.
Consistent with Neyapti (2003)￿ s ￿ndings, these results suggest that countries with
deep ￿nancial markets can easily ￿nance their budget de￿cits in the capital markets
without resorting to in￿ ationary ￿nancing. However, when we use liquid liabilities
to GDP ratio, we ￿nd no signi￿cant e⁄ects and its sign is also contrary to what is
generally expected.
20Table 3: Ordered logit results: the e⁄ects of ￿nancial sector development
Model 3 Model 3￿
Variables mfx0 mfx1 mfx2 mfx0 mfx1 mfx2
lygp -0.184*** -0.191* 0.251*** -0.186*** -0.0722* 0.258***
(0.0599) (0.183) (0.0483) (0.0591) (0.0551) (0.0504)
lexrg -0.424*** -0.208** 0.627*** -0.417*** -0.211*** 0.628***
(0.0743) (0.0774) (0.0844) (0.0727) (0.0694) (0.0805)
logtot -0.0269 -0.0554 0.112** -0.0281 -0.0883* 0.116**
(0.0284) (0.0385) (0.0492) (0.0272) (0.0417) (0.0458)
logopen -0.159** -0.0861** 0.196** -0.166** -0.0366** 0.203**
(0.0492) (0.0530) (0.0297) (0.0487) (0.0494) (0.0300)
loghorzn -0.188*** 0.114 0.128** -0.185*** 0.0555 0.130**
(0.0396) (0.0732) (0.0583) (0.0390) (0.0472) (0.0594)
rts -0.00955** 0.00294 0.00974 -0.00950** 0.000193 0.00931
(0.00409) (0.00485) (0.00577) (0.00406) (0.00382) (0.00577)
in￿ g -0.0129** -0.0145** 0.0270** -0.0129** -0.0141** 0.0270**
(0.00359) (0.00514) (0.00799) (0.00348) (0.00469) (0.00786)
logpcrdt 0.0604** 0.120** -0.0552**
(0.0172) (0.0363) (0.0361)
logll_gdp -0.0777 -0.0798 0.157
(0.0640) (0.138) (0.119)
Constant -0.00110 -0.00375** 0.00462** -0.00103 -0.00252* 0.00355*
(0.000704) (0.00134) (0.00183) (0.000614) (0.00139) (0.00184)
Observations 586 586 586 586 586 586
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15 15
R2 0.341 0.253 0.526 0.339 0.276 0.528
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Model 3 is the ordered logit model including private credit to GDP ratio
Model 3￿is the ordered logit model including liquid liabilities to GDP ratio
mfx0, mfx1 and mfx2 are marginal e⁄ects of having in￿ ation below the band, within the band and
above the band respectively.
21In Table 9, we report the results when we include all institutional variables to-
gether in the regression. We observe that the marginal e⁄ects of private credit to GDP
and liquid liabilities to GDP are not very di⁄erent from those reported in Table 3. In
fact, an increase in private credit to GDP still displays negative signi￿cant e⁄ects of
having in￿ ation above the target band while increasing signi￿cantly the probability of
achieving in￿ ation targets. Liquid liabilities are still insigni￿cant, possibly due to the
relatively high correlation with domestic debt.26 The less signi￿cant e⁄ect of liquid
liabilities to GDP may indicate that it is not a robust measure of ￿nancial sector
development. The other possibility could be that the credit channel transmission
mechanism of monetary policy is weak in EMEs.
5.4 Control Variables
Our discussion of control variables is based on Table 9. We only discuss the most
important variables which explain in￿ ation target deviations, that is exchange rate
gap, output gap, openness and in￿ ation target horizon. The results show that a 1%
increase in the exchange rate gap increases the probability of having in￿ ation above
the target by 0.7%, while decreasing the probability of achieving the target band
by 0.28%. The probability of having in￿ ation below the target also decreases by
0.41%. The marginal e⁄ects are signi￿cant at the 1%. This outcome suggests that
countries which experience sharp exchange rate ￿ uctuations and high exchange rate
pass-through e⁄ects have problems in meeting their in￿ ation targets. This is probably
the case for countries like South Africa in which most target misses were associated
with periods of high exchange rate volatility (Roger and Stone, 2005). Indeed, Ho
and McCauley (2003) argued that exchange rate volatilities have strong e⁄ects on
in￿ ation in EMEs.
The output gap also explains in￿ ation deviations from the bands. This means
that in￿ ation in EMEs is very sensitive to demand shocks. This highlights the fact
that demand led component of in￿ ation is an important determinant of in￿ ation
target deviations in EMEs and explains why central banks also include the output
gap in their loss functions. The evidence suggests that central banks should move
interest rates more to o⁄set demand shocks and bring in￿ ation back in the target
band. This contrasts the results of Gosselin (2008), possibly because of di⁄erences in
the composition of the samples used.
26see table 7
22The degree of openness seems to increase the chances of overshooting the upper
target bound while reducing chances of undershooting the lower bound. This result
contrasts with that of Campillo and Miron (1996) which shows a negative e⁄ect on
in￿ ation outcomes. Our results imply that EMEs being small and open, are greatly
exposed to external shocks and global in￿ ationary pressures (Fraga et al., 2003).
Another possible explanation could be that openness of EMEs have not reduced the
incentives by policy makers to pursue expansionary monetary policies.
We further observe the signi￿cant role of the in￿ ation target horizon. In this
case, specifying a longer in￿ ation target horizon increases chances of having in￿ ation
above the upper target while lowering the chances of having in￿ ation below the lower
target. The result suggests that long target horizons increase the time over which
in￿ ation can stay out of the target range. This may also imply that central banks
allow in￿ ation to return to target slowly in order to reduce volatility in real economic
activity. This may also highlight the fact that central banks are ￿ exible in dealing
with in￿ ation deviations from the target bands.
6 Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we conduct various robustness and sensitivity tests of the results.
Firstly, we test if our results are sensitive to alternative speci￿cations and distribu-
tional assumptions of the error terms. We specify the random e⁄ects ordered probit
model.27 The results are presented in Table 10. We observe that legal CBI still af-
fects negatively and signi￿cantly the probability of having in￿ ation above the target
band while a⁄ecting positively and signi￿cantly the probability of achieving in￿ ation
targets. The turnover rate is still insigni￿cant and exhibits signs contrary to expec-
tations. The ￿scal variables also do not change the results. In fact, budget de￿cits
a⁄ect positively and signi￿cantly the probability of in￿ ation target overshoots and
negatively the probability of in￿ ation target undershoots. However, the magnitudes
of the e⁄ects are marginally larger than those in the baseline case, but the conclu-
sions are basically consistent. For ￿nancial sector development indicators, the results
reveal, as in the baseline case, that an increase in private credit to GDP decreases the
probability of overshooting, while increasing signi￿cantly the probability of achieving
in￿ ation targets. Liquid liabilities to GDP ratio are still insigni￿cant, possibly imply-
ing that it may not be a good measure of ￿nancial sector development. This evidence
27The ordered probit model assumes normal distribution of the error process.
23therefore con￿rms that our results are not very sensitive to model speci￿cation and
distributional assumptions.28
Secondly, we estimate the model for two subperiods; the 1990s and the 2000s to
account for di⁄erent in￿ ation episodes which we observed in Figure 1. The 1990s
were associated with disin￿ ations while the 2000s, experienced more stable in￿ ation
(Roger and Stone, 2005). This can in￿ uence our results in many ways. For example,
the strength of the nominal anchor may vary depending on whether in￿ ation targets
are stable or not (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007). Also the global macroeconomic
conditions could have changed in the two periods which could a⁄ect the achievement
of in￿ ation targets.
Table 11 shows the results for the 1991-1999 subsample. We observe that legal
CBI has some explanatory power for positive in￿ ation deviations, negative in￿ ation
deviations as well as zero deviations. This con￿rms our earlier ￿nding that legal CBI
matters for the achievement of in￿ ation targets. However, the turnover rate of central
bank governors has no signi￿cant e⁄ects on in￿ ation target outcomes. Perhaps this
suggests that what was more important during this period was de jure CBI than
de facto CBI. As Fraga et al. (2003) argue, legal independence could have been a
pre-requisite to gain credibility so as to e⁄ectively stabilise in￿ ation. We also observe
that both ￿scal de￿cits and domestic debt have strong and signi￿cant e⁄ects on
in￿ ation deviations in the 1990s. However, both private credit to GDP ratio and liquid
liabilities to GDP seems to have less signi￿cant e⁄ects on in￿ ation target outcomes.
This is in line with ￿ndings from previous studies which con￿rm its weak impact
on in￿ ation target deviations (see e.g Gosselin, 2008). A possible explanation for
this weak e⁄ect on in￿ ation target outcomes is that, presumably many EMEs have
adopted IT in the presence of weak ￿nancial systems. Another possible explanation
is that the ￿nancial crises in Asia and Latin America in the 1990s, could have made
EMEs more vulnerable to high in￿ ation and currency crises (Mishkin, 2004).
The estimations for the 2000-2008 subsample is presented in ￿gure 12. We observe
that the statistical signi￿cance of legal CBI becomes weaker. However, turnover rate
exhibit strong signi￿cant e⁄ects on in￿ ation target outcomes. The results suggest
that what matters during the 2000s was actual CBI rather than legal CBI. The
signi￿cant e⁄ect of legal CBI in the 1990s compared to the 2000s also suggests that the
contribution of CBI to IT is largest during disin￿ ations than during stable in￿ ation
28We also experimented by including one institutional variable in the ordered probit model, but
this did not change our results. We did not present these results, but they are available on request.
24periods. Also most central bank reforms were done during the 1990s rather than
in the 2000s, which could have improved monetary policy credibility in dealing with
in￿ ation. The ￿scal variables seem to have strong e⁄ects on in￿ ation target outcomes.
For example, a 1% increase in budget de￿cits and domestic debt signi￿cantly increases
the probability of overshooting the upper target by 0.005% and 0.012% respectively.
This robustly con￿rms our baseline results and provides further support for the need
for ￿scal discipline in IT. On the ￿nancial institutional indicators, we observe that
private credit to GDP has strong e⁄ects on in￿ ation target outcomes, while liquid
liabilities to GDP seems to be less signi￿cant. This result could be linked with the
general improvements in the level of development of the ￿nancial systems in the 2000s
than in the 1990s.
Thirdly, there is a possibility that the ￿nancial crises from 2007 could have a⁄ected
our results through their e⁄ects on ￿scal balances, ￿nancial variables and macroeco-
nomic variables. Thus we test if the results remain stable when we exclude the
2007-2008 period from the whole sample. The results are presented in table 13. We
observe that legal CBI still explain in￿ ation target outcomes. The turnover rate of
central bank governors is now signi￿cant. This provides further support to the view
that the conduct of monetary policy must remain independent of political pressure
in order to achieve sustainable price stability. Consistent with the baseline results,
both budget de￿cits to GDP ratio and domestic debt to GDP ratio exhibit signif-
icant e⁄ects on in￿ ation target outcomes. However, the marginal contributions to
the likelihood of all in￿ ation response categories are relatively lower than those in
the baseline speci￿cation. On the ￿nancial variables, we observe that private credit
to GDP signi￿cantly a⁄ects in￿ ation target outcomes. Also liquid liabilities to GDP
exhibit the correct signs and are signi￿cant in all response categories. One possible
explanation for this result is that these measures are better indicators of ￿nancial
sector development in EMEs during stable periods than during crises.
Fourthly, it is often argued that institutional structures a⁄ect in￿ ation target out-
comes by enhancing the e⁄ectiveness of monetary policy (Cecchetti and Krause, 2001).
We test this hypothesis by interacting institutional variables with interest rates. The
results are shown in table 14. The results show that policy interest rates are more
e⁄ective in reducing in￿ ation target deviations in countries that have more indepen-
dent central banks when legal CBI indices are used. As emphasised by Bernanke
et al. (1999), this implies that CBI contributes to monetary policy strength and cred-
ibility by reducing the possibility of in￿ ation surprises. The marginal e⁄ects of the
25interacted ￿scal variables are all signi￿cant. This suggests that strong ￿scal institu-
tions improve the e⁄ectiveness of policy interest rates, thus underscoring the need for
￿scal discipline in in￿ ation targeting. Moreover, the results shows that ￿nancial sec-
tor development enhances the e⁄ectiveness of monetary policy when private credit to
GDP is interacted with policy rates. In general, these results supports the view that
monetary policy is likely to be more e⁄ective in countries with mature institutions.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyses the role of central bank independence, ￿scal discipline and ￿nan-
cial sector development on the achievement of in￿ ation targets. It focuses on in￿ ation
deviations from the target bands rather than deviations from the mean. Inorder to
test the hypothesis, the panel ordered logit model was applied.
The results show that improvement in central bank independence, ￿scal discipline
and ￿nancial sector development help to reduce the probability of missing the target
bands. These results therefore support the view that monetary, ￿scal and ￿nancial
institutional structures matter for in￿ ation targeting in EMEs, once we control for
macroeconomic and other factors. We also conclude from the results that improve-
ment in these institutional structures tend to enhance the e⁄ectiveness of monetary
policy. These institutional factors are not orthogonal, in fact, they reinforce each
other since their combined impact is quite large.
Although these institutional structures explain in￿ ation target outcomes in EMEs,
other factors also matter. The results show that control variables such as output gap,
exchange rate gap, openness and in￿ ation target horizon also seem to explain in￿ ation
target outcomes. This suggests that in￿ ation in EMEs is sensitive to macroeconomic
developments, which could explain why some countries with good institutional struc-
tures have often missed their in￿ ation targets.
The ￿ndings suggest that the process of institutional reform of central banks,
￿scal institutions and ￿nancial institutions should continue for countries to achieve
sustainable price stability. What is needed is an institutional framework that can
respond, adapt and perform e⁄ectively while inducing responsible government behav-
iour and restraining abuses of macroeconomic policies. In fact, good institutional
frameworks should be complemented by sound good macroeconomic policies to bring
sustainable price stability. The results also suggest that policy makers should pay
attention to both domestic and external factors, since they also account for in￿ ation
26target deviations even in countries where these institutions are good. More impor-
tantly, the strong e⁄ects of the exchange rate gap on in￿ ation target outcomes suggest
that EMEs must consider their greater vulnerability to exchange rate shocks in the
formulation of monetary policy. These ￿ndings have important implications both for
countries preparing to adopt in￿ ation targeting and the current in￿ ation targeters.
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318 Appendix
A: Econometric model: Ordered Logit
Inorder to explain the process underlying in￿ ation deviations from the bands, we
assume that the latent variable Y ￿
it is explained by a set of institutional and other
control variables. We follow Wooldridge (2002) and model the process as :
Y
￿
it = Instit￿ + Xit￿ + "it; t = 1;:::;T; and i = 1;:::;N (2)
"it=Xi ￿ D(0;1): (3)
Where Y ￿
it is the latent variable depicting in￿ ation deviations, Instit captures
institutional variables, Xit captures control variables, "it are independent and identi-
cally distributed random variables, and ￿ and ￿ are vectors of slope coe¢ cients for
institutional and control variables respectively. The observed indicator variable Yit
which is the realised in￿ ation in relation to target bands which is determined from
the latent variable Y ￿





0 if Y ￿
it < ￿1i
1 if ￿1i < Y ￿
it ￿ ￿2i
2 if Y ￿
it > ￿2i
(4)
￿1i and ￿2i are threshold parameters re￿ ecting lower and upper in￿ ation target
bands respectively. The observed variable Yit depends on whether or not a particular
threshold point has been crossed. In￿ ation takes a value of 0 if it is below the band
(negative deviation), 1 if it is within the band (no deviation) and 2 if it is above the
band (positive deviation).
The response probabilities of the occurrence of each in￿ ation target outcome are
:
P(Yit = 0) = P(Y
￿
it ￿ ￿1i) = ￿(￿1i ￿ XitB) (5)
P(Yit = 1) = P(￿1i < Y
￿
it ￿ ￿2i) = ￿(￿2i ￿ XitB) ￿ ￿(￿1i ￿ XitB) (6)
P(Yit = 2) = P(Y
￿
it > ￿2i) = 1 ￿ ￿(￿2i ￿ XitB) (7)
The parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood and the log likelihood func-







1[Yit = 0]ln[F(￿1i ￿ Xit￿)] + 1[Yit = 1]ln[F(￿2i ￿ Xit￿) ￿ F(￿1i ￿ Xit￿)]
+1[Yit = 2]ln[1 ￿ F(￿2i ￿ Xit￿)]
￿
(8)
where F(Xt) is the cumulative probability distribution function of "it taken at Xit
B: Marginal e⁄ects of the ordered logit model
When we use discrete choice model, the parameters that are normally provided are
the marginal e⁄ects. But in the case of the panel data, no programme is available in
the stata package which can help us to do this directly. We use the GLLAMM module
by Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2004) to estimate the ￿xed e⁄ects ordered logit model. We
follow a strategy of computing marginal e⁄ects which is done in 3 steps.
Step1: We run the gllamm command in stata, making sure that f(binom) and
adapt are set as options.
Step2: We compute the predicted probabilities for each outcome; the gllapred
command can help to achieve this.
Step 3: We compute the marginal e⁄ects of each outcome, using xtreg to regress
the ￿rst di⁄erence of the predicted probability of each outcome on the ￿rst di⁄erence
of all the previous explanatory variables.
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34Table 4: In￿ ation targeting emerging market economies
Country Adoption Target Previous Target Target Policy
date range* anchor measure horizon rate
Brazil 1999Q1 2-7 ER CPIA Ann/Multi Year Celic rate
Chile 1991Q1 2-4 ER CPI Ann/Multi Year Policy rate
Colombia 2000Q1 4.5-5.5 ER CPI Ann/Long term Intervention rate
Czech Republic 1998Q1 2-4 ER & MS CPI Ann/Multi Year Repo rate
Hungary 2001Q1 2.5-4.5 ER CPI Ann/Long term Base rate
Indonesia 2005Q1 5-7 MS CPI Ann Bank rate
Israel 1992Q1 1-3 ER CPI Ann/Indef Bank rate
Mexico 1999Q1 2-4 ER CPI Ann/Long term Overnight rate
Peru 1994Q1 1.5-3.5 MS CPI Indef Reference rate
Philippines 2002Q1 5-6 ER & MS CPI Annual Repo rate
Poland 1999Q1 1.5-3.5 ER CPI Ann/Med/Indef Policy rate
South Africa 2000Q1 3-6 MS CPIX Ann/Med term Repo rate
South Korea 1998Q1 2.5-3.5 MS CPI Ann/Med term Base rate
Thailand 2000Q2 0-3.5 MS Core CPI Ann/Indef Repo rate
Turkey 2006Q1 2-6 ER CPI Annual Overnight rate
Key : ER= Exchange Rate, MS= Money supply , CPI= Consumer Price Index
Ann = Annual. Indef =Inde￿nate, Med term= medium term
*In￿ ation target ranges are for the end of 2008
Sources: Mishkin and Schmidt Hebbel (2007) and Various Central Bank Websites
35Table 5: Variables descriptions and sources
Variables Description Sources
in￿ dc In￿ ation deviations from the bands. IFS, Datastream and
It is the ordinal discrete dependent variable. Central bank websites
logcbi1 Log of central bank independence is measured Cukierman et al (1992),
by legal cbi index developed by Cukierman et al 1992 updated by Crowe and
It is computed from sixteen di⁄erent legal characteristics Meade (2008),
found in central bank laws. Higher indices indicates Polillo and Guillen (2005)
higher central bank independence and Authors￿updates
logpcrdt Private credit to GDP ratio measures the ￿nancial World Development Indicators
sector development. Credit that ￿nancial intermediaries and IFS
issue to the private sector as a share of GDP. Higher
values indicates higher ￿nancial sector development
bd Primary ￿scal balance to GDP ratio measuring IFS and Datastream
￿scal discipline. It re￿ ects budget de￿cit or surplus.
lygp Output gap is the di⁄erence between the log of actual Data obtained from IFS
and trend GDP. Hodrick Prescott ￿lter with a smoothing Output gap computed
parameter of ￿ = 1600 is used in the estimation from HP ￿lter
lexrg Log of the nominal exchange rate gap. It controls Data obtained from IFS, but
for exchange rate-in￿ ation pass-through e⁄ects Exchange rate gap
often observed in EMEs computed from HP ￿lter.
tot Terms of trade indices. Calculated as the ratio of IFS and Datastream
the index of export prices to the index of import prices.
logopen Openness is measured by exports plus imports IFS
to GDP ratio. It measures the intensity of the economy￿ s
interaction into the world trade
rts Policy rates capture central bank interest rate policy Central bank websites
decisions.
in￿ g Lagged value of in￿ ation is measured as in￿ ation from IFS and Datastream
the past period.
loghorzn Log of in￿ ation target horizon is the number of Roger and Stone (2005)
periods it takes for in￿ ation to return to target
bands after a shock. It controls for structural
features of in￿ ation targeting
logll_gdp Log liquid liabilities to GDP ratio as an alternative IFS and
proxy for ￿nancial sector development. Are World Development
composed of currency plus demand and interest Indicators
bearing liabilities of banks and non banks
debt Government domestic debt as a percentage of GDP. Global Insight and World
Development Indicators
logtor Log of turnover rate of central bank governors. Crowe and Meade (2008)
De facto measure of CBI. and Central Bank Websites
Higher values shows low CBI
36Table 6: In￿ ation Outcomes Relative to Target Ranges
Country Frequency Magnitude Duration
Below Within Above Below Above Below Above
Target Target Target Target Target Target Target
Brazil 7.50 57.50 35.0 -2.14 5.33 3.00 7.00
Chile 15.28 45.83 38.5 -0.89 1.43 2.6.0 3.70
Colombia 0.00 61.11 38.89 0.00 1.06 0.00 3.60
Czech Republic 28.57 40.48 30.95 -1.70 2.33 2.70 3.30
Hungary 21.43 39.29 39.87 -0.77 3.30 2.00 5.00
Indonesia 0.00 37.50 62.50 0.00 5.40 0.00 5.00
Israel 12.50 13.89 73.61 -4.30 14.0 2.75 8.50
Mexico 0.00 47.50 52.50 0.00 1.30 0.00 3.50
Peru 30.00 45.00 25.00 -1.10 2.21 3.00 2.14
Philippines 42.86 10.71 46.43 -1.21 2.95 6.00 6.50
Poland 35.00 32.50 32.50 -0.64 1.70 2.80 4.30
South Africa 16.67 36.11 47.22 -1.50 3.20 2.00 3.50
South Korea 29.55 40.91 29.55 -0.79 1.87 3.25 2.60
Thailand 0.00 77.78 22.22 0.00 2.37 0.00 4.50
Turkey 0.00 41.67 66.67 0.00 2.95 0.00 11.00
Average 15.96 41.85 42.75 -1.00 3.43 2.01 4.94
Notes : Frequency in %, Absolute magnitude in %, Duration in Quarters.
Sources: Authors￿computations based on IFS, Datastream and Central bank websites
Table 7: Correlation matrix of variables
infdc bd lexrg logtot rts logcbi1 lygp logopen loghorzn logpcrdt logtor debt logll_gdp in￿ag
infdc 1.00
bd 0.04 1.00
lexrg -0.16 0.01 1.00
logtot -0.02 -0.04 -0.17 1.00
rts -0.27 -0.3 0.01 -0.56 1.00
logcbi1 -0.04 -0.24 0.07 -0.19 0.15 1.00
lygp 0.01 -0.05 -0.11 0.02 0.04 -0.01 1.00
logopen -0.01 0.12 -0.06 0.1 -0.5 0.08 -0.16 1
loghorzn 0.04 -0.15 0.14 -0.04 0.31 -0.00 -0.02 -0.4 1
logpcrdt -0.08 0.32 0.01 0.33 -0.43 -0.05 0.04 0.42 -0.47 1.00
logtor 0.15 -0.51 0.10 0.25 -0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.33 -0.08 0.03 1.00
debt 0.08 0.45 0.13 0.08 0.35 0.36 -0.009 -0.38 0.42 -0.67 -0.06 1.00
logll_gdp -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.24 -0.30 -0.26 0.01 0.21 -0.23 0.78 0.03 -0.6 1.00
in￿ag 0.46 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.47 -0.09 -0.04 -0.16 -0.36 0.14 -0.03 0.14 0.330 1.00
37Table 8: Panel unit root tests based on the Fisher type test
Variable logcbi1 bd logpcrdt tot lexrg rts logopen lygp logtor debt logll_gdp in￿g loghorzn
￿2 477.39 265.8 77.12 456.2 70.05 85.01 41.8 413.6 62.22 56.8 100.66 55.23 64.36
P Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.003 0.00 0.000 0.003 0.009
38Table 9: Ordered logit results: The e⁄ects of all instititutional variables
Model 4 Model 4￿
Variables mfx0 mfx1 mfx2 mfx0 mfx1 mfx2
lygp -0.126* -0.174* 0.301*** -0.152** -0.0803 0.232***
(0.0678) (0.0933) (0.0538) (0.0668) (0.0540) (0.0488)
lexrg -0.413*** -0.285*** 0.697*** -0.408*** -0.281*** 0.689***
(0.0722) (0.0777) (0.0908) (0.0788) (0.0889) (0.0851)
logtot 0.00639 -0.0945 0.0881 -0.0509 -0.0192 0.0700*
(0.0230) (0.0545) (0.0519) (0.0406) (0.0401) (0.0349)
logopen -0.145*** -0.0671 0.212*** -0.156** -0.0541 0.210***
(0.0476) (0.0455) (0.0309) (0.0570) (0.0552) (0.0287)
loghorzn -0.191*** 0.120 0.0713* -0.165*** 0.0449 0.120**
(0.0486) (0.0821) (0.0546) (0.0430) (0.0599) (0.0554)
rts -0.0103** 0.000130 0.0102* -0.00936* 0.000193 0.00916
(0.00408) (0.00438) (0.00564) (0.00446) (0.00422) (0.00568)
in￿ g -0.0124*** -0.0131** 0.0255*** -0.0134*** -0.0140** 0.0273***
(0.00319) (0.00447) (0.00719) (0.00395) (0.00477) (0.00838)
logcbi1 0.0508** 0.161** -0.111**
(0.0630) (0.0744) (0.0570)
bd -0.00525*** -0.00157* 0.00682***
(0.000642) (0.00122) (0.000598)
logpcrdt 0.0552** 0.113** -0.0579**
(0.0164) (0.0353) (0.0346)
logtor 0.0133 0.0165 -0.0299*
(0.0127) (0.0148) (0.0151)
logll_gdp -0.0751 -0.0516 0.127
(0.0743) (0.158) (0.117)
debt -0.00201*** -0.00370*** 0.00572***
(0.000263) (0.000278) (0.000422)
Constant -0.00136* -0.00296** 0.00433** -0.00131* -0.00198 0.00329*
(0.000671) (0.00134) (0.00172) (0.000641) (0.00148) (0.00177)
Observations 586 586 586 586 586 586
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15 15
R2 0.422 0.277 0.582 0.333 0.273 0.541
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Model 4 is the ordered logit model including baseline institutional variables logcbi1, bd and logpcrdt
Model 4￿is the ordered logit model including alternative institutional variables logtor;debt and logll_gdp
mfx0, mfx1 and mfx2 are marginal e⁄ects of having in￿ ation below the band, within the band and
above the band respectively. 39Table 10: Ordered probit results
Model 5 Model 5￿
Variables mfx0 mfx1 mfx2 mfx0 mfx1 mfx2
lygp -0.348*** -0.0617** 0.348*** -0.228*** -0.0797 0.307***
(0.0589) (0.0288) (0.0589) (0.0629) (0.0656) (0.0606)
lexrg -0.707*** -0.0582*** 0.707*** -0.449*** -0.300*** 0.750***
(0.0639) (0.0165) (0.0639) (0.0584) (0.0718) (0.0638)
logtot -0.0916* 0.0293 0.0916* -0.0486 -0.000989 0.0495
(0.0470) (0.0198) (0.0470) (0.0387) (0.0477) (0.0464)
logopen -0.197*** -0.0178 0.197*** -0.159*** -0.0544 0.214***
(0.0572) (0.0146) (0.0572) (0.0511) (0.0571) (0.0581)
loghorzn -0.120*** 0.0572 0.120*** -0.143*** 0.0367 0.106***
(0.0411) (0.0429) (0.0411) (0.0300) (0.0444) (0.0354)
rts -0.0120** 0.0014** 0.0120** -0.00955** -0.00115 0.0107*
(0.00576) (0.000840) (0.00576) (0.00447) (0.00352) (0.00612)
in￿ g -0.0258*** 0.00119*** 0.0258*** -0.0125*** -0.0142*** 0.0267***
(0.00611) (0.000453) (0.00611) (0.00385) (0.00327) (0.00655)
logcbi1 0.110*** 0.00145* -0.110***
(0.0338) (0.00895) (0.0338)
bd -0.000271** -0.00778*** 0.000271***
(0.000408) (0.000445) (0.000408)
logpcrdt 0.0613* 0.00178* -0.0613*
(0.0522) (0.00874) (0.0522)
logtor 0.00811 0.0170 -0.0251*
(0.0103) (0.0132) (0.0142)
logll_gdp -0.100 -0.00403 0.104
(0.0928) (0.111) (0.107)
debt -0.00262*** -0.00355*** 0.00618***
(0.000357) (0.000398) (0.000340)
Constant -0.00403 -6.09e-05 0.00403 -0.000974 -0.00212 0.00310
(0.00309) (0.000777) (0.00309) (0.00278) (0.00289) (0.00321)
Observations 586 586 586 586 586 586
R2 0.487 0.334 0.487 0.384 0.330 0.601
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15 15
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Model 5 is the ordered probit model including initial institutional variables logcbi1, bd and logpcrdt
Model 5￿is the ordered probit model including alternative institutional variables logtor, debt and logll_gdp
mfx0, mfx1 and mfx2 are marginal e⁄ects of having in￿ ation below the band, within the band and
above the band respectively. 40Table 11: Ordered logit results for the sample period 1991-1999
Model 6 Model 6
Variables mfx0 mfx1 mfx2 mfx0 mfx1 mfx2
lygp -0.141** -0.154* 0.295*** -0.121** -0.192* 0.313***
(0.433) (0.286) (0.266) (0.447) (0.335) (0.216)
lexrg -0.332* -0.0200* 1.352* -1.407** -0.0942** 1.501**
(0.577) (0.398) (0.594) (0.528) (0.353) (0.555)
logtot 0.167** 0.187* -0.354*** 0.322*** 0.164 -0.486***
(0.0688) (0.0872) (0.0707) (0.0764) (0.0923) (0.0557)
logopen -0.0392 -0.204 0.243 -0.125 -0.180 0.305*
(0.249) (0.268) (0.184) (0.223) (0.255) (0.159)
loghorzn -0.0354 0.0177 0.0177 0.0289 0.0493 -0.0782
(0.0328) (0.0460) (0.0188) (0.0483) (0.0270) (0.0705)
rts -0.0171 -0.00734 0.0244 -0.00441 -0.00676 0.0112
(0.0153) (0.0121) (0.0210) (0.0107) (0.0114) (0.0184)
in￿ g -0.00749* -0.00812** 0.0156* -0.0107*** -0.00791** 0.0186***
(0.00418) (0.00275) (0.00683) (0.00251) (0.00306) (0.00521)
logcbi1 0.796* 0.491* -0.305*
(0.042) (0.024) (0.340)
bd -0.00394** -0.000154** 0.00379**
(0.00453) (0.00459) (0.00424)
logpcrdt 0.205 0.277 -0.482
(0.170) (0.351) (0.462)
logtor -0.0706 -0.0319 0.102
(0.0589) (0.0420) (0.0982)
logll_gdp 0.0998 0.342 -0.442
(0.668) (0.457) (0.964)
debt -0.0201** -0.00764** 0.0124**
(0.00381) (0.00233) (0.00177)
Constant 0.00893* -0.000728 -0.00821 0.0147** -0.00959* -0.00511
(0.00385) (0.00548) (0.00621) (0.00590) (0.00470) (0.0101)
Observations 111 111 111 111 111 111
R-squared 0.461 0.297 0.547 0.579 0.289 0.635
Number of countries 8 8 8 8 8 8
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Model 6 is the ordered logit model for the period 1991- 1999 when baseline institutional variables
(logcbi1,bd and logpcrdt) are included. Model 6￿is the ordered logit model for the period 1991-1999 when
alternative institutional variables (logtor, debt,and logll_gdp) are included.
mfx0, mfx1 and mfx2 are marginal e⁄ects of having in￿ ation below the band, within the band and
above the band respectively.
41Table 12: Ordered logit results for the period 2000-2008
Model 7 Model 7
Variables mfx0 mfx1 mfx2 mfx0 mfx1 mfx2
lygp -0.0176** -0.230** 0.248** -0.0303** -0.0909** 0.121**
(0.113) (0.139) (0.0638) (0.0818) (0.0656) (0.0606)
lexrg -0.280*** -0.333** 0.612*** -0.279*** -0.255* 0.534***
(0.0645) (0.120) (0.0953) (0.0728) (0.143) (0.103)
logtot 0.0516 -0.131* 0.0794 -0.00689 -0.129 0.136**
(0.0581) (0.0639) (0.0521) (0.0617) (0.0761) (0.0482)
logopen -0.0914* -0.141* 0.233** -0.125* -0.0388* 0.164**
(0.0578) (0.0698) (0.0578) (0.0644) (0.0547) (0.0570)
loghorzn -0.187* 0.0864 0.101 -0.201* 0.0380 0.163**
(0.0770) (0.171) (0.0977) (0.0857) (0.131) (0.0571)
rts -0.00137 -0.00123 0.00260 -0.00122 0.000649 0.000571
(0.00636) (0.00795) (0.00487) (0.00607) (0.00570) (0.00574)
in￿ g -0.0428*** -0.0324*** 0.0753*** -0.0441*** -0.0327*** 0.0768***
(0.00622) (0.00856) (0.00885) (0.00677) (0.00843) (0.00947)
logcbi1 0.130 0.436 -0.306*
(0.262) (0.316) (0.0940)
bd -0.00439*** -0.00113*** 0.00552***
(0.000899) (0.00141) (0.000588)
logpcrdt 0.170*** 0.0301*** -0.140***
(0.0273) (0.0526) (0.0364)
logtor -0.0113* -0.0320* 0.0433*
(0.0146) (0.0173) (0.0132)
logll_gdp -0.0414 -0.252 0.293*
(0.193) (0.199) (0.0972)
debt -0.000107** -0.00150** 0.00161**
(0.000269) (0.000238) (0.000160)
Constant 0.00147 -0.000386 -0.00109 0.00226* -0.000524 -0.00174
(0.00112) (0.00191) (0.00131) (0.00110) (0.00174) (0.00114)
Observations 466 466 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.502 0.225 0.732 0.475 0.225 0.718
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15 15
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Model 7 is the ordered logit model for the period 2000-2008 when baseline institutional variables
(logcbi1,bd and logpcrdt) are included. Model 7￿is the ordered logit model for the period 2000-2008 when
alternative institutional variables (logtor, debt and ll_gdp) are included.
mfx0, mfx1 and mfx2 are marginal e⁄ects of having in￿ ation below the band, within the band and
above the band respectively.
42Table 13: Ordered logit results for the sample which excludes 2007-2008 period
Model 8 Model 8￿
Variables mfx0 mfx1 mfx2 mfx0 mfx1 mfx2
lygp -0.139*** -0.374*** 0.513*** -0.180*** -0.112*** 0.292***
(0.0495) (0.0857) (0.0639) (0.0564) (0.0495) (0.0374)
lexrg -0.781*** -0.403*** 1.184*** -0.859*** -0.311** 1.169***
(0.0997) (0.126) (0.107) (0.116) (0.117) (0.102)
logtot 0.0467 -0.118 0.0718 -0.0106 -0.00572 0.0164
(0.0394) (0.0840) (0.0522) (0.0291) (0.0410) (0.0306)
logopen 0.00773** -0.128** 0.121** -0.00541** -0.0837** 0.0891**
(0.0626) (0.0712) (0.0509) (0.0677) (0.0669) (0.0383)
loghorzn -0.120*** 0.135* -0.0152 -0.0941*** 0.0650 0.0291
(0.0386) (0.0721) (0.0524) (0.0276) (0.0527) (0.0579)
rts -0.00703* -0.00122 0.00825 -0.00700* -0.00110 0.00811
(0.00337) (0.00341) (0.00502) (0.00391) (0.00326) (0.00554)
in￿ g -0.0100*** -0.0118*** 0.0218*** -0.0108*** -0.0126*** 0.0233***
(0.00282) (0.00326) (0.00527) (0.00344) (0.00387) (0.00673)
logcbi1 0.000813* 0.0776* -0.0784*
(0.0675) (0.0644) (0.0108)
bd -0.00662*** -0.000512*** 0.00714***
(0.000734) (0.00158) (0.000975)
logpcrdt 0.0350* 0.297* -0.261*
(0.0727) (0.152) (0.130)
logtor 0.00562* 0.0466* -0.0522*
(0.0126) (0.0229) (0.0188)
logll_gdp 0.214** 0.444*** -0.230**
(0.148) (0.141) (0.124)
debt -0.000854** -0.00326*** 0.00411***
(0.000349) (0.000369) (0.000480)
Constant -0.000753 0.00112 -0.000366 -0.000378 0.00120 -0.000826
(0.00116) (0.00175) (0.00172) (0.000364) (0.000946) (0.00106)
Observations 466 466 466 466 466 466
R-squared 0.467 0.262 0.647 0.375 0.252 0.606
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15 15
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Model 8 is the ordered logit model including all institutional variables the for period excluding 2007-8
Model 8￿is the ordered logit model including all alternative institutional variables for period excluding 2007-8
mfx0, mfx1 and mfx2 are marginal e⁄ects of having in￿ ation below the band, within the band and
above the band respectively.
43Table 14: Ordered logit results: Interaction e⁄ects
Model 9 Model 9￿
Variables mfx0 mfx1 mfx2 mfx0 mfx1 mfx2
lygp -0.164** -0.105** 0.268** -0.207** -0.0593** 0.266**
(0.0628) (0.0677) (0.0512) (0.0916) (0.0862) (0.0565)
lexrg -0.443*** -0.276*** 0.720*** -0.385*** -0.278*** 0.663***
(0.0688) (0.0791) (0.0805) (0.0942) (0.0912) (0.0979)
logtot -0.0108 -0.0924* 0.103** -0.0521 -0.0212 0.0733*
(0.0236) (0.0455) (0.0470) (0.0447) (0.0360) (0.0361)
logopen -0.141** -0.0410 0.182*** -0.120 -0.0330 0.153***
(0.0543) (0.0445) (0.0362) (0.0700) (0.0559) (0.0444)
loghorzn -0.195*** 0.0724 0.122** -0.232*** 0.0520 0.180***
(0.0450) (0.0574) (0.0473) (0.0456) (0.0566) (0.0359)
in￿ g -0.0122*** -0.0134*** 0.0256*** -0.0156** -0.0108** 0.0264**
(0.00338) (0.00461) (0.00755) (0.00625) (0.00439) (0.00982)
logcbi1_r 0.00548** 0.194** -0.189**
(0.0444) (0.0620) (0.0659)
logpcrdt_r 0.120* 0.108* -0.0118*
(0.0265) (0.0411) (0.0380)
bd_r -0.000231*** -0.000153*** 0.000383***
(3.85e-05) (5.09e-05) (1.62e-05)
logtor_r 0.00589** 0.00724** -0.0131**
(0.00165) (0.00182) (0.00258)
debt_r 0.000267*** 0.000356*** -0.000623***
(8.23e-05) (7.37e-05) (6.52e-05)
logll_gdp_r -0.00104 -0.0146 0.0156*
(0.00617) (0.00861) (0.00530)
Constant -0.000715 -0.00305*** 0.00376** -0.00157 -0.00208* 0.00365**
(0.000552) (0.000991) (0.00129) (0.00119) (0.00101) (0.00149)
Observations 586 586 586 586 586 586
R2 0.358 0.297 0.562 0.364 0.213 0.512
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15 15
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Model 9 is the ordered logit model when interest rates are interacted with logcbi1;bd and logpcrdt
Model 9￿is the ordered logit model when interest rates are interacted with logtor;debt and logll_gdp
mfx0, mfx1 and mfx2 are marginal e⁄ects of having in￿ ation below the band, within the band and
above the band respectively.
44